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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
This case involves allegations that several Deputy United 
States Marshals used excessive force during a court- 
ordered eviction. On appeal, the marshals contend that the 
district court erred by refusing to grant summary judgment 
in their favor on grounds of qualified immunity. Because we 
conclude that the marshals are entitled to summary 
judgment on all the plaintiffs' claims, we reverse. 
 
I 
 
Bonnie and Wilkie Mellott ("the Mellotts") are former 
owners of land in Pennsylvania on which they resided and 
operated a dairy farm. The Mellotts' son, Kirk, also resided 
on the property in a separate house located about a mile 
away from his parents' home. In the early 1980s, the 
Mellotts borrowed money to purchase additional land and 
to make improvements on their farm. After falling far 
behind in their debt payments, the Mellotts filed a 
voluntary petition for bankruptcy in 1989. The Mellotts' 
property was sold at a public auction in November 1992, 
and the bankruptcy court issued an order directing the 
Mellotts to vacate the premises by December 10, 1992. 
 
The Mellotts failed to leave their former property by that 
date, and the bankruptcy court issued an order of 
contempt on December 21, 1992. The court directed the 
Mellotts, under penalty of incarceration and/or fine, to 
vacate the premises by December 28, 1992. The Mellotts 
still refused to leave and instead responded byfiling a 
motion to vacate the judgment, a notice of appeal, a motion 
to disqualify the bankruptcy judge, and a notice of motion 
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to stay. On December 31, 1992, the bankruptcy court 
denied the Mellotts' motions and signed a writ of assistance 
directing the United States Marshal Service to serve the 
Mellotts with a notice stating that all persons and personal 
property had to be removed from the premises by January 
5, 1993. The deputy marshals testified that they posted the 
notices at the Mellotts' residence on December 31, 1992, 
and Kirk Mellott testified that he found a notice on his door 
that same day. Kirk further testified that he discussed the 
notice with his parents and understood that the notice 
ordered him to vacate the premises. 
 
After the Mellotts again failed to leave by the ordered 
date, the bankruptcy court issued a writ of assistance, 
dated January 11, 1993, directing the United States 
Marshal Service to secure the auctioned land and remove 
all persons from the premises. Upon receipt of the writ, 
Supervisory Deputy United States Marshal Robert Byerts 
assigned Deputy Marshal Don Heemer to head a team of 
five deputy marshals ("the marshals") that would remove 
the Mellotts from the property. Byerts testified that he 
provided the marshals with the following information prior 
to the eviction: 
 
       a. The Bankruptcy Court had requested additional 
       security for hearings at which the Mellotts were 
       expected to appear; 
       b. A Farmers Home Administration [FHA] County 
       Supervisor had reported that Wilkie Mellott had 
       chased him off the Mellott property at the front of 
       a pick-up truck; that Wilkie Mellott had displayed 
       a handgun after chasing the County Supervisor off 
       the property in a pick-up truck; that Wilkie Mellott 
       had threatened to shoot any federal agent that 
       came on his property; and that the County 
       Supervisor had felt his life had been threatened by 
       Wilkie Mellott. 
       c. The Mellotts were reported to own numerous 
       firearms. 
       d. Kirk Mellott had recently sustained a serious head 
       injury and was considered unstable. 
       e. Kirk Mellott had informed Deputy Marshals Regan 
       and Knicely that the Mellotts were not going to 
       leave the farms. 
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App. 59-60. See also App. 100-110, 114, 117, 162-63 
(deposition of Donald Heemer); App. 182-85 (deposition of 
David Seich).1 Byerts further testified that the marshals 
wore bullet-proof vests and "were authorized to use a short 
shotgun and an AR-15 semi-automatic rifle in the removal 
operation because of concerns that they might meet armed 
resistance at the Mellott residences." App. 59. 
 
On the morning of January 21, 1993, the marshals met 
with at least two uniformed state troopers and drove to the 
Mellotts' residence. Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiffs, the eviction proceeded as follows.2 
 
When the officers arrived at the Mellotts' residence, they 
approached the house, and Deputy Marshal Heemer 
knocked on the front door. After Bonnie Mellott answered 
the door, Heemer entered the house, pointed his gun "right 
in her face," pushed her into a chair, and kept his gun 
aimed at her for the remainder of the eviction. App. 264-65, 
424, 441. Deputy Marshall David Seich entered the house 
next, "pumped a round into the barrel" of his sawed-off 
shotgun, pointed it at Wilkie Mellott, and told him"to sit 
still, not move and to keep his mouth shut." App. at 265. 
See also App. at 440-41. With respect to this encounter, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Like the district court, we consider the existence of the Byerts' 
briefing 
to be undisputed. See Dist. Ct. Op. at 8. Although the plaintiffs 
disagree, 
see Appellees' Br. at 25-29, they have presented no evidence to 
contradict the marshals' testimony that the briefing took place. Rather, 
the plaintiffs have merely demonstrated that there is a dispute as to 
whether all of the information Byerts provided to the marshals was 
accurate. For example, the Mellotts presented evidence that contradicted 
the FHA agent's account of his confrontation with Wilkie Mellott. It is 
not 
relevant, however, that the Mellotts have disputed the agent's version of 
events. Rather, the critical question is whether the agent's account was 
provided to the marshals by their supervisor. The marshals testified that 
it was, and the plaintiffs point to no evidence indicating otherwise. 
 
2. We note that the marshals dispute nearly every material factual 
allegation made by the plaintiffs, including the most serious claims that 
the deputy marshals pointed loaded guns at various individuals during 
the eviction. For purposes of summary judgment, however, we must view 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See 
Peters v. Delaware River Port Authority, 16 F.3d 1346, 1349 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
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there is evidence that the marshals were aware before the 
eviction that Wilkie Mellott was recovering from heart 
surgery. Supp. App. at 9 n.3 & 42. Behind Seich, two more 
marshals entered the house along with a state trooper who 
identified himself and said that he "was there for 
everybody's protection." App. at 266. 
 
Also present in the Mellotts' home at the time of the 
eviction were Michelle Hollinshead, a radio reporter, and 
Jackie Wright, a friend of the Mellotts. When the marshals 
entered the residence, Wright was in the front room with 
the Mellotts, and Hollinshead was in the kitchen on the 
telephone with the local sheriff. Hollinshead testified that 
one of the marshals ran into the kitchen, "pumped" his 
semi-automatic gun, "stuck it right in [her] face and . . . 
said: `Who are you talking to, hang up the phone.' " App. at 
454-55. See also App. at 461-63. After Hollinshead 
continued talking, the marshal put his gun "to the back of 
her head" and told her to "[s]hut the hell up and hang up 
the phone." App. at 455. At this point, Hollinshead hung up 
the phone, and the marshal put his gun into her back and 
shoved her down a hallway towards the front room. 
 
In the meantime, while two marshals were conducting a 
sweep of the residence,3 Wilkie Mellott said he felt ill and 
requested his medication. When Bonnie Mellott rose to get 
the medication, Deputy Heemer pushed her back into her 
chair and asked her where the medication was located. 
After receiving this information, Heemer retrieved Wilkie 
Mellott's medication and handed it to him. 
 
At some point during the eviction, Bonnie Mellott 
overheard the marshals discussing their plans to remove 
Kirk Mellott from his residence, and she offered to 
accompany them to Kirk's house. The marshals rejected 
this offer but agreed to allow Jackie Wright to come with 
them. In their depositions, both Wright and Bonnie Mellott 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Our account of the facts does not include the plaintiffs' allegations 
that the marshals violated the Constitution by "ransacking" the Mellotts' 
former residences. See Appellees' Br. at 32-34. The district court found 
that the plaintiffs' "ransacking" claim did"not rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation," Dist. Ct. Op. at 27 n.10; id. at 24, and the 
plaintiffs have not appealed this holding. 
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explained that they were concerned about how Kirk might 
react to the marshals, see App. at 272 & 426, and Bonnie 
testified that she believed it would be helpful if Kirk saw a 
"familiar face." App. at 310. Before proceeding to Kirk's 
house, the deputy marshals directed Bonnie and Wilkie 
Mellott to leave the property, and Deputy Heemer allegedly 
told them to start driving and not to look back or they 
would be shot. Bonnie Mellott also testified that Heemer 
said they would be shot as trespassers if they went to 
Kirk's house. 
 
After the Mellotts departed, Jackie Wright drove to Kirk's 
residence in his own vehicle, followed by the marshals and 
the state troopers. Wright testified that, once at the house, 
the marshals told him that he "was going to go through the 
door first ahead of them." App. at 429. One marshal 
advised Wright "that if anything goes wrong . . . you're 
going to be the first one to go down," and as they were 
"heading into the house," Wright felt a "gun in [his] back." 
Id. See also App. at 379. Wright entered the house without 
knocking and found Kirk Mellott sitting in his living room 
with a bag full of his belongings. Defendant Heemer then 
approached Kirk, "aimed his gun at [his] chest, physically 
took [him] by the arm, spun him around and pushed him 
up against the wall." App. at 386-87. After searching Kirk's 
bag and conducting a sweep of the residence, the marshals 
escorted the two men out of the house and ordered them off 
the property. 
 
The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in January 
1995, alleging, inter alia, that the individual defendants 
violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable seizures and their Fifth Amendment right to 
substantive due process. The defendants moved for 
summary judgment on the ground that they were entitled 
to qualified immunity, and the district court denied their 
motion, finding that there were material issues of fact as to 
(1) whether the defendants violated the plaintiffs' Fourth 
and Fifth Amendment rights by using excessive force 
during the eviction and (2) whether the defendants 
reasonably could have believed that their conduct did not 
violate clearly established law. We have jurisdiction over the 
defendants' appeal under the collateral order doctrine. See 
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Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 605 (3d Cir. 1994) (in 
banc). 
 
II 
 
A. The marshals are entitled to qualified immunity if, at 
the time they acted, they reasonably could have believed 
that their conduct did not violate the plaintiffs' clearly 
established constitutional rights. See Sharrar v. Felsing, 
128 F.3d 810, 826 (3d Cir. 1997). In addressing the 
qualified immunity question, we first ask whether the 
plaintiffs have "asserted a violation of a constitutional right 
at all." Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991). Because 
we conclude that they have not, we must reverse the 
district court's denial of summary judgment. 
 
The Supreme Court has instructed that "all claims that 
law enforcement officers have used excessive force. . . in 
the course of a[ ] . . . `seizure' of a free citizen should be 
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 
`reasonableness' standard, rather than under a `substantive 
due process' approach." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 
395 (1989). Since all of the plaintiffs' excessive force claims 
in the instant case involve allegations that the marshals 
restrained the plaintiffs' liberty through physical force and 
the pointing of guns, we must analyze the plaintiffs' claims 
under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 395 n.10. 
 
In order to prevail on a Fourth Amendment excessive 
force claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
defendant's use of force was not "objectively reasonable." 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). Proper 
application of this standard "requires careful attention to 
the facts and circumstances of each particular case, 
including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the 
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the 
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest 
or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Id. at 396. In 
addition, we have noted that it is important to consider how 
many individuals the officers confronted and whether "the 
physical force applied was of such an extent as to lead to 
injury." Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 
1997). When balancing these factors, we must remember 
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that "[t]he `reasonableness' of a particular use of force must 
be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on 
the scene, rather then with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." 
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. "The calculus of reasonableness 
must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are 
often forced to make split-second judgments -- in 
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly 
evolving -- about the amount of force that is necessary in 
a particular situation." Id. at 396-97. We must also keep in 
mind that a threat that may seem insignificant to us in the 
security of our chambers may appear more substantial to a 
reasonable officer whose own life or safety is at stake. 
 
B. Turning to the case before us, the plaintiffs' claims 
all center on allegations that the deputy marshals pointed 
loaded guns at their heads, chests, and backs. In addition, 
Bonnie Mellott claims that she was pushed into a chair on 
two occasions, and Jackie Wright claims that he was led at 
gunpoint into a potentially dangerous situation. 
 
We have recently considered allegations of excessive force 
similar to those made here. In Sharrar, more than 20 law 
enforcement officers surrounded a house containing four 
suspects wanted in connection with a particularly violent 
domestic assault. 128 F.3d at 814-816. After the suspects 
complied with the officers' instruction to exit the house 
backwards, they were ordered to lie face-down in the dirt. 
Id. at 816. The plaintiffs claimed that, at this point, the 
officers held guns to their heads, yelled obscenities, and 
threatened to "blow [their] brains out" if they moved. Id. at 
816 & 821. While we acknowledged that the officers' alleged 
conduct "appear[ed] extreme," id. at 821, we concluded that 
it did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 822. 
 
The marshals contend that their actions cannot be found 
unlawful since the Mellotts' "allegations of force . . . are 
minimal compared to the allegations of force found to be 
constitutionally permissible in Sharrar." Appellants' Br. at 
23. While we do not necessarily agree that the allegations 
in this case are "minimal" compared to those in Sharrar, we 
do believe that the explicit threats alleged in Sharrar were 
at least as forceful as the implicit threats alleged here. 
However, contrary to the marshals' suggestion, it is not 
enough simply to compare the force used in this case with 
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the force employed by the officers in Sharrar. Several of the 
"reasonableness" factors discussed in Graham and Sharrar 
weigh differently here than they did in Sharrar, with some 
favoring the Mellotts and others favoring the deputy 
marshals. Therefore, while comparison to Sharrar can be 
instructive, our reasonableness determination must 
ultimately turn on the unique facts and circumstances 
confronting the marshals in this case. 
 
Looking first to the "severity of the crime" factor from 
Graham, we note that the marshals were not arresting the 
Mellotts for a violent crime, but rather were removing them 
from their former property after they repeatedly failed to 
obey a court order. We also note, however, that an eviction 
from a cherished family residence can be an emotionally 
charged event. Turning to the "active resistance" factor 
discussed in Graham, we conclude that this factor does not 
weigh in favor of the deputy marshals since there is 
virtually no evidence of resistance during the eviction itself.4 
However, the final Graham factor --"threat to the safety of 
officers or others" -- weighs heavily in the marshals' favor 
and leads us to conclude that their alleged conduct during 
the eviction was objectively reasonable at the time. 
 
Prior to the eviction, Supervisor Byerts informed the 
deputy marshals that Wilkie Mellott had threatened to 
shoot any federal agent who came on his property, was 
reported to own numerous firearms, and had chased an 
FHA agent off his property with a pick-up truck. Moreover, 
Byerts told the marshals that Kirk Mellott was considered 
unstable and had stated that the Mellotts would not leave 
the property. In light of these warnings, the marshals had 
significant reason to fear armed confrontation. Under these 
circumstances, it was objectively reasonable for the 
marshals to load and point their weapons in an effort to 
discourage resistance and ensure their own safety. 
 
While the luxury of hindsight might enable us to think of 
alternatives to the marshals' actions, we must heed the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Because Michelle Hollinshead's testimony indicates that she did not 
hang up the phone immediately after being told to do so by one of the 
marshals, this factor does weigh in favor of the defendants with respect 
to actions taken after Hollinshead disobeyed the marshal's instruction. 
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Supreme Court's admonition to account for the "tense, 
uncertain, and rapidly evolving" circumstances facing 
officers at the time of their actions. Here, when the deputy 
marshals entered the front room of the Mellotts' house, 
they discovered not only Bonnie and Wilkie Mellott, but a 
third unidentified individual, Jackie Wright, and they heard 
a fourth unidentified individual, Michelle Hollinshead, 
talking in another room. At the time, the marshals had no 
way of knowing to whom Hollinshead was speaking on the 
phone, and the marshals reasonably could have feared that 
she was calling a confederate of the Mellotts. In this 
respect, it is noteworthy that Kirk Mellott, whom the deputy 
marshals believed to be unstable, had not yet been found. 
On a related note, we find that one of the additional 
reasonableness factors discussed in Sharrar -- "the number 
of persons with whom the police officers must contend at 
one time," 128 F.3d at 822 -- weighs significantly in the 
marshals' favor. Unlike in Sharrar, where there were over 
20 officers on hand to confront four individuals who 
peaceably surrendered en masse, here there were fewer 
than 10 officers present to contend with five individuals 
who were not all found in the same place at the same time. 
 
Our conclusion that the marshals acted reasonably is 
further bolstered by another factor discussed in Sharrar: 
whether the force applied by the officers led to physical 
injury. Although Wilkie Mellott did experience chest pains 
during the eviction, the marshals promptly retrieved his 
medicine, and there is no allegation that Wilkie Mellott 
suffered any further complications. In addition, while the 
plaintiffs claim that Bonnie Mellott was pushed into a chair 
on two occasions, they present no evidence of resulting 
physical injury. In this respect, we must be mindful of the 
Supreme Court's instruction that "[n]ot every push or shove 
. . . violates the Fourth Amendment." Graham, 490 U.S. at 
396. 
 
In sum, in light of the reports of the Mellotts' threatening 
behavior, the uncertainty of the situation confronting the 
marshals during the eviction, and the lack of any physical 
injury to the plaintiffs, we find that the force used by the 
marshals in confronting Bonnie Mellott, Wilkie Mellott, 
Michelle Hollinshead, and Kirk Mellott was objectively 
reasonable at the time. 
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C. Several arguments made by the dissent require a 
brief response. First, contrary to the dissent's argument, 
this case is easily distinguishable from Baker v. Monroe 
Township, 50 F.3d 1186 (3d Cir. 1995). In Baker, the court 
held, among other things, that the facts could support a 
finding that certain law enforcement officers violated the 
Fourth Amendment when they pointed firearms at and 
handcuffed Inez Baker, two of her children, and a foster 
daughter. These individuals had been invited to Sunday 
dinner at the apartment of Inez Baker's son, but they had 
the misfortune to arrive just as the officers were conducting 
a drug raid on the apartment. Viewing the facts in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiffs, the court concluded that 
"the appearances were those of a family paying a social 
visit" and that there was "simply no evidence of anything 
that should have caused the officers to use the kind of force 
they are alleged to have used." Id. at 1193. Here, for the 
reasons already discussed, the marshals had reason to fear 
for their safety when they entered the Mellott residence. 
 
The dissent points out that "defendant Heemer himself 
testified in his deposition that pointing a gun at an 
unarmed person was `absolutely' inappropriate conduct." 
Dissent at 15, lines 39-40 to 16, line 1. But our task here 
is to apply constitutional standards, not standards of 
"appropriateness." Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 515 
(1995); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 193-96 & n.14 
(1984). 
 
The dissent observes that "whatever fear the marshals 
had to cause them to descend on the Mellott farm with 
guns blazing was immediately dissipated when they 
encountered a pastoral scene of several people sitting 
peaceably in a parlor." Dissent at 16, lines 24-27. Putting 
aside (a) the fact that the marshals' guns were never fired 
and thus were not "blazing" in the usual sense of that term 
and (b) the fact that violence can erupt in a "pastoral" (i.e., 
country) setting, a reasonable officer was not, in our view, 
required to banish all fear upon seeing that Bonnie and 
Wilkie Mellott and Jackie Wright were sitting in the parlor 
with no firearms in view. A reasonable officer could have 
feared that firearms might be hidden and that the 
individuals in the parlor might have tried to obtain access 
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to them. A reasonable officer also could have feared that 
other persons might be in other rooms in the house. As we 
noted, the officers encountered one unidentified person, 
Jackie Wright, in the parlor, heard another, Michelle 
Hollinshead, talking in another room, and had no 
knowledge of the whereabouts of Kirk Mellott. 
 
The dissent states that "[w]hile it might have been 
reasonable for the marshals to approach and enter the 
home in an aggressive mode," the officers should have 
"adjust[ed] their response" when "Wilkie Mellott assured 
[them] that no one else was in the house and since they 
knew the marshals were coming, he had removed the 
guns." Dissent at 16, lines 27-34. However, a law 
enforcement officer with his or her own safety at stake 
could have reasonably proceeded with greater skepticism. 
 
D. Jackie Wright's claim, while also subject to the 
considerations discussed above, is somewhat unique and 
requires additional analysis. The relevant facts, as stated by 
Wright in his deposition, are as follows: 
 
       I pulled in front of [Kirk Mellott's] house and . . . 
       walked back toward the marshals' car. [One of the 
       marshals] told me to come over there and I walked over 
       there. And he told me I was going to go through the 
       door first ahead of them. And he said, I want to advise 
       you that if anything goes wrong in here you're going to 
       be the first one to go down[,] and as we were heading 
       into the house, I felt a gun in my back. 
 
App. at 429. Based on this account, the plaintiffs contend 
that the marshals violated the Constitution by using Wright 
as an unwilling "human shield" in a potentially dangerous 
situation. 
 
We hold that the defendants are entitled to summary 
judgment on this claim because the evidence in the 
summary judgment record cannot support a finding that 
Jackie Wright was seized or that a reasonable officer could 
not have believed that Wright was not seized. " `[A] person 
has been `seized' within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have 
believed that he was not free to leave.' " California v. Hodari 
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D., 499 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1991), quoting United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1986) (opinion of Stewart, 
J.). See also Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 
(1988); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984). Here, it 
is undisputed that the marshals did not restrain Wright's 
liberty when he accompanied them to Kirk Mellott's 
residence. The marshals did not compel Wright to go with 
them; on the contrary, they originally refused when Bonnie 
Mellott asked to accompany them but eventually acceded to 
Wright's request. Thus, in order to survive summary 
judgment on his Fourth Amendment claim, Wright would 
have to point to evidence in the summary judgment record, 
that at some point after he arrived at Kirk's house, he 
changed his mind and decided that he did not want to 
enter the house with the marshals but that the marshals 
forced him to do so. No such evidence, however, has been 
called to our attention. There is no evidence that the 
marshals told Wright that he was not free to leave. 
Moreover, Wright did not state during his deposition that 
he ever told the marshals that he wished to leave or to 
remain outside Kirk's house. Nor did he testify that the 
marshals ever told him that he was not free to leave or to 
stay outside the house. 
 
In light of this background, the summary judgment 
record is insufficient to convince a reasonable fact finder 
that a reasonable person in Wright's position would have 
felt that he was not free to leave the scene or to stay 
outside the house. Wright points to his deposition 
testimony that one of the marshals told him that he was 
"going to go through the door ahead of them" and that if 
anything went wrong he was "going to be the first to go 
down." App. 429. However, in light of the fact that Wright 
had sought permission to accompany the marshals when 
they went to find Kirk Mellott, this statement alone was 
insufficient to convey to a reasonable person in Wright's 
position the message that he was not free to leave. Instead, 
the statement seems to convey the message that a 
condition of the permission given to Wright to enter the 
house was that he take the most dangerous lead position 
when the entry was made. 
 
Wright notes that he "felt a gun in [his] back" as he 
walked into the house. App. 429. But, in light of the 
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background previously noted, this evidence is also 
insufficient to convey to a reasonable person in Wright's 
position the message that he was not free to go. With 
Wright in the lead and with the marshals following close 
behind with their guns drawn, it would not be surprising 
for Wright to feel a gun touch his back even though he was 
entering the house voluntarily. Taking the evidence in the 
summary judgment record as a whole, we hold that there is 
not enough to show that Wright was seized. 
 
Moreover, even if a reasonable fact finder could conclude 
that Wright was in fact seized, the defendants would still be 
entitled to summary judgment based on qualified 
immunity. A reasonable officer in the position of the 
marshals could easily have thought that a reasonable 
person in Wright's position -- having asked to accompany 
them, having never expressed a desire to depart or to stay 
outside the house, and having never been told that he was 
not free to do so -- would not feel that his liberty was 
restrained.5 
 
III 
 
For the reasons explained above, we reverse the district 
court's denial of the defendants' summary judgment 
motion, and we remand for the entry of judgment in their 
favor. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In arguing that Wright's "human shield" claim should be analyzed 
under Fourth Amendment, rather that substantive due process, 
standards, the defendants' reply brief states that "it is difficult to 
imagine a more clear allegation of "seizure" of one's person than claiming 
that a law enforcement officer held one at gun point as a human shield." 
Reply Br. at 13. We do not interpret this as a concession that Wright 
was in fact seized. Rather, we interpret this statement to mean only that 
compelling a person to function as a human shield would constitute a 
seizure. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
The majority's conclusion that the conduct in this case 
was, without doubt, objectively reasonable and not 
excessive based upon plaintiff's chilling tale runs counter 
to our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as most recently 
explicated in Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1186 (3d 
Cir. 1995) -- relied upon by the district court but not 
mentioned in the majority's opinion -- and Sharrar v. 
Felsing, 128 F.3d 810 (3d Cir. 1997). I must part company 
with my colleagues because I agree with the district court's 
well-reasoned determination that the issue of 
reasonableness of the marshals' conduct under the 
circumstances of this case is properly a question for the 
jury. 
 
In Baker, we addressed conduct similar to the marshals' 
actions here, namely, the pointing of guns, as well as the 
use of handcuffs, stating that the use of this type of force 
must be justified by the circumstances. We noted that "we 
must look at the intrusiveness of all aspects of the incident 
in the aggregate." 50 F.3d at 1193. Baker involved a police 
stop and detention of three individuals entering a residence 
while the police were conducting a drug raid. The police 
stopped them, pushed them down to the ground with guns 
drawn, and handcuffed and detained them for 15-25 
minutes. We reversed the district court's grant of qualified 
immunity because there was sufficient evidence from which 
a jury could find a Fourth Amendment violation. The police 
in Baker admitted that the use of handcuffs would have 
been "inappropriate" until there was an arrest. We assessed 
the police conduct in the following terms: 
 
       Here, accepting the Bakers' testimony, the police used 
       all of those intrusive methods without any reason to 
       feel threatened by the Bakers, or to fear the Bakers 
       would escape . . . the appearances were those of a 
       family paying a social visit . . . there is simply no 
       evidence of anything that should have caused the 
       officers to use the kind of force they are alleged to have 
       used. 
 
Id. Similarly, in this case, defendant Heemer himself 
testified in his deposition that pointing a gun at an 
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unarmed person was "absolutely" inappropriate conduct. 
Further, the marshals encountered a peaceful scene with 
no indication of resistance or force on the part of the 
Mellotts, and there is no evidence of anything that should 
have caused them to use the force indicated here. 
 
The majority distinguishes the instant situation on the 
basis of the threat to the safety of the officers. However, in 
reality, a jury might well determine that the likelihood of 
violence toward the marshals was not so great, given the 
context of the incident discussed below, and the fact that 
the only person who had witnessed aggressive behavior on 
the part of the Mellotts was an agent of the Farmers Home 
Administration who had been chased off the farm property 
by Mellott in a pickup truck. 
 
The court's opinion fails to note a few facts which could 
color a jury's view of the overall atmosphere and context of 
the incident in question. First, the Mellotts had made 
themselves notorious for their litigious ways, and they, 
along with other farmers being counseled by the same 
advisor, were suing the Farmers Home Administration. This 
fact was not lost on the marshals effecting the evictions. 
Nor, I would imagine, were they unaware that the Mellotts 
were testing the patience of various federal agencies.1 
Furthermore, whatever fear the marshals had to cause 
them to descend on the Mellott farm with guns blazing was 
immediately dissipated when they encountered a pastoral 
scene of several people sitting peaceably in a parlor. While 
it might have been reasonable for the marshals to approach 
and enter the home in an aggressive mode, the clearly 
passive conduct of those present should have caused them 
to adjust their response to the situation accordingly. Officer 
Heemer testified specifically that Wilkie Mellott assured him 
that no one else was in the house and since they knew the 
marshals were coming, he had removed the guns. The force 
used thereafter was not clearly, objectively reasonable, and, 
given our precedent in Baker as a guide, the jury should be 
the judge of this conduct. I also disagree with the majority's 
view that Jackie Wright's Fourth Amendment rights were 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Mrs. Mellott testified that the bankruptcy judge said he would "make 
an example" of them. 
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not violated as a matter of law as he accompanied the 
marshals to Kirk Mellott's house, notwithstanding having a 
gun in his back and being told he would be first to go down 
if anything went wrong. I find this situation as presenting 
at least an arguable seizure, depending upon whose version 
of the facts the jury believes. 
 
Although the majority analogizes this situation to 
Sharrar, I submit that the facts in that case are quite 
different. Sharrar involved the propriety of the arrests of 
individuals wanted for assault, holed up in a home in an 
otherwise peaceful seashore community, and the extent of 
force employed by teams of law enforcement personnel in 
surrounding the residence and effecting the arrest of these 
individuals. The majority in Sharrar stated that the Rambo- 
type behavior under the circumstances came "close to the 
line," although not constituting a Fourth Amendment 
violation. 128 F.3d at 822. 
 
Here, where seven marshals detained and terrorized a 
family and friends, and ransacked a home, while carrying 
out an unresisted civil eviction, their conduct, which could 
be described as Gestapo-like, is even closer to the line, if 
not over the line. We should not cloak it in the protective 
veil of immunity at the summary judgment stage. Just as 
in Baker, where we reversed summary judgment granting 
qualified immunity so that a jury could judge the objective 
reasonableness of the police conduct, here we should affirm 
the excellent reasoning of the district court, following our 
precedent in Baker, that genuine issues exist as to the 
reasonableness of the marshals' behavior. The matter 
should proceed to trial on the issue of the alleged violations 
of the Fourth Amendment rights of all of the plaintiffs and 
the marshals' entitlement to qualified immunity. I would 
affirm. 
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